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Abstract
In this paper we provide a model which describes how voluntary
disclosure impacts on the timing of a rm's investment decisions. A
manager chooses a time to invest in a project and a time to disclose the
investment return in order to maximise his monetary payo. We assume
that this payo is linked to the level of the rm's stock price. Prior to
investing, the protability of the project and the market reaction to the
disclosure of the investment return are uncertain, but the manager re-
ceives signals at random points in time which assist in resolving some of
this uncertainty. We nd that a manager whose objective can only be
achieved through voluntarily disclosing the return is motivated to invest
at a time that would be sub-optimal for an identical manager with a
prot maximising objective.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the inuence of corporate voluntary
disclosure on the timing of a rm's investment decision when the manager
of the rm has incomplete information regarding the true protability of the
investment and the true market response to the investment strategy. Voluntary
disclosures relate to those announcements willingly made by rms outside of
their legal and regulatory requirements. We develop a theoretical model of
investment whereby the manager of a rm acquires an option to disclose the
return arising from some investment venture only after the investment has
been undertaken. The real options methodology is used to develop the model.
This technique has been widely applied to investment decisions (see Dixit
and Pindyck [6] for a general presentation of real options and investment),
but the use of real options methodology in relation to voluntary disclosure
has been relatively scant (see Dempster [5]). This is surprising given that
voluntary disclosure decisions share three important characteristics with many
investment decisions; i.e., they are irreversible, the payo is uncertain, and the
decision-maker has some leeway over deciding when to disclose.
In our model, the manager of a rm has the option to invest in some risky
venture. Once he exercises this investment option, he acquires another separate
option which is to voluntarily disclose to the market the return acquired from
investing. He only acquires the disclosure option after having invested, and
the value of his option to invest is dependent upon the value of his option to
disclose. So, we view investment and disclosure as a compound option, which is
a novel viewpoint. A related paper to ours is Mittendorf [21] who considers the
issue of information revelation in a real options framework. However, in that
paper the information is revealed via an action taken by the manager which
serves as a signal to outsiders about the potential protability of the project in
which the manager chooses to invest. In our paper, we interpret information
disclosure as the direct communication to outsiders via some medium such as
a press release, the company website, or annual and quarterly reports.
In order for the disclosure option to have value, we assume that the man-
ager's remuneration is dependent on the level of his rm's stock price. This
is motivated by the fact that the manager's disclosure of investment returns
is unexpected information to market participants (henceforth referred to as
the \investors"), who subsequently respond by altering their demand for the
rm's shares. This impacts positively or negatively on the rm's pre-disclosure
stock price level and, hence, on the manager's compensation. If the manager's
remuneration was not linked in some way to the impact from disclosure, then
the option to disclose would have no value and the manager's investment pol-
icy would be formed with a prot maximising objective. Indeed, this is the
benchmark scenario against which we compare our results.
The manner in which we deal with uncertainty diers from standard real
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options models (for example, Dixit and Pindyck [6] and McDonald and Siegel
[20]) where uncertainty is constant over time. In our model, uncertainty is
resolved over time because the manager receives signals at irregular intervals
about the expected protability of the investment and the associated market
response, similar to the approach of Thijssen et al. [30]. However, their model
pertains to a stand-alone investment timing decision whereas our model incor-
porates the voluntary disclosure option into the optimal stopping problem.
The problem of adjusting the standard real options model of complete infor-
mation to one of incomplete information has become popular in the operations
research literature. For example, Hsu and Lambrecht [16] and Nishihara and
Fukushima [23] consider the problem, but in the context of strategic games.
Our paper is somewhat related to Shibata [27] who also considers a real op-
tions model of incomplete information where uncertainty is resolved over time.
However, the purpose of his paper diers from ours in that his aim is to ex-
amine the impact of state variable uncertainty on the real options value and
its trigger. To achieve this objective, the set-up of his model is more closely
related to the standard approach in that he formulates the underlying state
variable as a stochastic process, whereas we formulate it as a random vari-
able since this is a more appropriate approach to achieve our objective. In his
model, learning occurs via a Kalman ltering procedure whereas in our model,
information uncertainty is resolved via the arrival of irregular signals.
Our contribution provides a theoretical framework for the growing body
of survey, anecdotal, and empirical evidence which nds that managers of
corporations take real economic actions (for example, postpone undertaking
protable investments) which could have negative long-term consequences on
rm value in an attempt to manage their reported earnings. For example,
Graham et al. [10] survey and interview more than 400 executives and nd
that 78 percent of their sample admits to sacricing long-term value to smooth
reported earnings, while over half of survey respondents (55.3 percent) state
that they would delay starting a new project to meet a reported earnings
target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrice to value. In support of
the evidence provided by Graham et al. [10], Roychowdhury [25] argues that
rms overinvest and give sales discounts to meet their reporting targets.
We consider two separate scenarios. In one scenario the market fully ob-
serves the investment timing strategy of the manager, but does not observe
the investment return. We refer to this as the observable investment decision.
In the other scenario, the market does not observe if and when the manager
invests and, thus, cannot determine whether or not the manager has under-
taken an investment until he opts to disclose the investment return. We refer
to this as the unobservable investment decision.
We nd that when a disclosure option holds value for a rm's manager his
investment strategy can become sub-optimal. In particular, the manager will
invest too early relative to an identical prot-maximising manager (i.e., one for
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whom the disclosure option holds no value) if the positive stock price impact
is expected to be high relative to the negative stock price impact, and he will
invest too late if the positive stock price impact is expected to be low relative
to the negative stock price impact. Furthermore, the manager may even risk
investing in a negative net present value (NPV) venture if the expected positive
stock price impact is suciently high relative to the expected negative stock
price impact and if, simultaneously, the signals which the manager receives are
not very informative.
Moreover, we show that when the investment decision is unobservable, the
manager will invest but withhold disclosing the return acquired until at a
later date. A possible motivation for this behaviour is that the manager may
consider the investment to be a worthwhile venture for the rm, but expects
that if the market participants were to learn of it at the time of investment
they may not fully appreciate its potential. Therefore, the investors may need
to be prepared for the product before its existence is revealed. That way, when
the manager does disclose, the likelihood of a positive stock price impact is
greater.1
Even though the objective of this paper is to understand the determinants
of rms' investment decisions, rather than a rm's disclosure policy, our paper
is related at some level to the voluntary disclosure literature. One of the
earliest ndings in this literature, provided by Grossman and Hart [12] and
Grossman [11], has become known as the \unraveling result". If the managers
of rms holding private information choose not to disclose their information to
outside investors, then the investors will discount the value of the rm to the
lowest possible value consistent with whatever rm-specic information they
have. Once the managers realise this, they will have an incentive to make full
disclosure.
The unraveling argument is relevant to our model when the manager's
investment strategy is fully observed by the market. However, when the in-
vestment strategy is not observed by the market, the unraveling argument will
not hold because we assume that the manager cannot communicate his lack
of investment. This implies that when the investment decision is not observed
by investors until the manager discloses, the rm is indistinguishable from a
rm which has not invested. Since our objective is not to investigate a rm's
equilibrium disclosure policies, we do not consider how non-disclosure impacts
on investment timing.Therefore, in the unobservable investment case, we as-
1The launch of Apple's iPad can provide some anecdotal evidence on this issue. At a
technology conference in Los Angeles in June 2010, CEO of Apple, Steve Jobs, admitted
that the company had developed the iPad before the iPhone, but the announcement of
its development was postponed until almost three years after the iPhone was launched
(FoxNews [9]). Jobs's justication for this strategy was that the ideas on which the iPad is
based \work just as well on a mobile phone". However, at that time, the iPad was unknown
and something that Jobs suspected the market did not realise it had a use for, whereas a
mobile phone was something that everybody used.
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sume that the investors observing non-disclosure do not infer anything about
a rm's investment strategy, and thus, non-disclosure implies that the impact
on the stock price is zero. By making this assumption we are able to isolate
and identify how disclosure per se aects a rm's investment timing policy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we de-
scribe the economic environment from both the manager's perspective and the
market's perspective. In Section 3 we focus on the situation whereby the in-
vestment strategy is fully observed by the market while in Section 4 we consider
the case whereby the investment strategy is not known until the disclosure op-
tion is exercised. In Section 5 we present the benchmark model of investment
against which our results are compared and in Section 6 we present the results
that emerge from our model. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the implications
of these results for corporate policy and outline some possible directions for
future research. All proofs are placed in the Appendix.
2 An Embedded Options Model for Invest-
ment and Disclosure
2.1 The Manager's Perspective
Consider a risk-neutral manager who has the opportunity to undertake some
risky investment. The payo from the investment is uncertain; it can be high,
denoted by UP , or low, denoted by UN . We assume without loss of generality
that UN = 0. Once the investment option is exercised, its return is assumed
to be immediately observed by the manager. We denote the sunk costs of
investing by I > 0, where it is assumed that I  UP .2
We assume that the realisation of the investment return is private informa-
tion to the manager. This implies that upon investment he acquires another
option to voluntarily disclose the return to the market. If the disclosure option
is then subsequently exercised, the market reacts to the manager's disclosure
by altering its demand for the rm's shares which, thus, impacts on the rm's
stock price level.
We also assume that the voluntary disclosure is fully credible if the invest-
ment option is exercised, and is fully incredulous otherwise. This implies that
if a rm invests, but then chooses not to disclose, it is indistinguishable from a
2We assume, as is standard in the real options literature, that the manager has all the
resources necessary to invest. There is a body of literature which deals with projects where
this is not the case. For example, in Sabarwal [26], the manager nances part of the sunk
investment cost with debt. However, that paper examines the issue about whether a rm's
capital structure aects his investment timing decision. For analytical convenience we use
the standard assumption of sucient funds.
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rm that has not invested at all; i.e., the rm cannot credibly communicate its
lack of investment. This is because, in our model, the disclosure option is only
acquired by the manager subsequent to him having invested. The assumption
of fully credible (or truthful) disclosure is very standard in the disclosure litera-
ture and the justication for this assumption is the potentially large penalties,
for example, reputational damage, of deliberately misinforming the market.
Aside from facing uncertainty over the investment return, the manager
also faces uncertainty over the market response to the disclosure: it can be
\favourable", leading to a positive discounted impact on the stock price level,
or \unfavourable", leading to a negative discounted impact. This impact will
be modelled in subsection 2.2. For now, it suces to remark that the stock
price will be impacted either positively or negatively as a result of the disclo-
sure. We further assume that any direct costs associated with disclosure, for
example, the costs associated with producing and disseminating the informa-
tion, are negligible compared to the impact from disclosure and, hence, the
sunk costs of disclosure are zero.3
The objective of the manager is to adopt (i) an investment and (ii) a dis-
closure policy such that his own (discounted) expected utility from his com-
pensation is maximised. In order for the disclosure option to be valuable to
the manager, we assume that the his compensation is dependent on the rm's
stock price level.4
2.1.1 The Manager's Information Environment
Since the manager's remuneration is linked to his rm's stock price, he only
cares about the investment's return through the channel of stock market per-
ceptions. Hence, the manager's investment decision is based on his belief about
the market reaction to the subsequent disclosure. We assume that over time
the manager receives a stream of signals pertaining to market sentiment to-
wards the rm in case the manager would disclose a positive or a negative
return. Such signals could, for example, include forecasts issued by nan-
cial analysts. A positive forecast would increase the manager's belief in a
favourable response, whereas a negative forecast would lower this belief.
The arrival of these signals follows a Poisson process with parameter  > 0
which is consistent with the dynamics governing the arrival of signals in the
model of Thijssen et al. [30]. In particular, this implies that if we denote by
nt the number of signals the manager has at time t, then
dnt =

1 with probability dt
0 with probability 1  dt; (1)
3Sunk disclosure costs can easily be introduced but this would be at the expense of
parsimony and analytical convenience without leading to any new economic insights.
4This is plausible since stock and stock options are very popular forms of compensation
in many corporations (Hall and Murphy [14]; Hall [13]).
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where n0 = 0. Additionally, we denote by gt the number of signals the manager
has at time t which are indicative of a favourable market response and by nt gt
the number of signals indicative of an unfavourable market response. In our
set-up, the number of signals indicating a positive market reaction net of the
number of signals indicating a negative market reaction is a sucient statistic
for the manager's optimal investment policy. At time t  0 the net number of
signals is denoted by st := gt   (nt   gt) = 2gt   nt.
Each signal gives imperfect information about what the true market re-
action will be. We assume that the probability that the signal is correct is
given by  2 (1=2; 1).5 A signal is correct if it is indicative of a favourable
(unfavourable) response (i.e., it is a positive (negative) signal), and the true
market response does indeed turn out to be favourable (unfavourable). A cor-
rect signal is a binomially distributed random variable with parameters n and
.
Whenever a signal is observed, the manager updates his belief in a positive
market response in a Bayesian way. We suppose that the manager has a prior
(before the investment option is exercised) over the probability of a favourable
market reaction, denoted by F , equal to p0 2 (0; 1); i.e.,
P (F ) = p0:
The probability that the response will be favourable conditional on having n
signals, g of which are positive is given by
P (F jn; g) = P (n; gjF )P (F )
P (n; gjF )P (F ) + P (n; gjUF )P (UF )
=

n
g

g(1  )n gp0
n
g

g(1  )n gp0 +

n
g

n g(1  )g(1  p0)
=
2g n
2g n + (1  )2g n
=
s
s + (1  )s ;
(2)
where  = 1  p0=p0 is the prior odds ratio.
Note that P (F jn; g), denoted by pt hereafter, is a monotonically increasing
function in st, and that the inverse function is given by
st := s(pt) =
log

1 pt
pt

  log()
log
 
1 

 : (3)
5This assumption is made without loss of generality because a choice of  = 12 implies
that the signal is pure noise, since the initial prior is not revised. Furthermore, a choice of
 = 0:2 is as informative as a choice of  = 0:8 since the same analysis may be carried out
for 1  .
7
This implies that the analysis of the solution can apply to either the net number
of signals or the posterior belief. In terms of solving for the model and analysing
the results that emerge, we use both approaches intermittently, depending on
analytical convenience.
At a given point in time, the manager uses both the quality, , and quantity,
, of signals to determine his own valuation of the investment opportunity. The
process by which this value is determined will be made clear in subsequent
sections.
2.2 Managerial Uncertainty over Market Response
The assumption that the manager is uncertain about the market response to
his disclosure about the investment return deserves some explanation. The
return from undertaking the investment project is (perfect) private informa-
tion to the manager. Conversely, investors have their own private information
regarding the return of other possible investment opportunities (i.e., besides
the opportunity to invest in the rm) which they cannot communicate to the
manager.6 This information advantage over the manager may arise for several
reasons. Suijs [29] identies these reasons as being that some of the investors
may have acquired their own costly private information on other investment
opportunities or that they may be more sophisticated in analysing nancial and
other available information than the manager \as investors are specialised in
doing just that". Consequently, the manager faces uncertainty over the market
response because this response is conditional on each of the investors' private
information about their expected utilities from investing in other assets.
In a full Bayesian equilibrium describing the interaction between the man-
ager and the investors, strategies are chosen such that (i) the capital allocation
decision of the investors maximise their expected utilities with respect to their
posterior beliefs about the expected utility he would derive from investing in
the rm relative to investing elsewhere, and (ii) that the investment (and sub-
sequent disclosure) timing strategy of the manager maximises his expected
(discounted) utility from his compensation given the investors' capital allo-
cation decisions and their posterior beliefs. We focus on the latter condition
by assuming that the capital allocation decision by the investors satises the
former.
6The latter assumption is also made by Suijs [29]. As he points out, \for disclosure to
be useful, a large body of investors should disclose their private information and the rm
should collect and process all of this information. This approach is likely to be very costly
and subject to cognitive constraints, so rms remain imperfectly informed about investors'
private information."
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2.3 The Impact of the Market Response
When the manager discloses his investment's return, the market updates its
belief about his expected utility from investing in the rm relative to investing
elsewhere and responds by allocating his capital accordingly. If, after disclo-
sure by the manager, an investor's expected utility from investing in the rm
is worse than his expected utility from investing elsewhere, he responds un-
favourably by selling o some of his existing shares in the rm and invests
instead in other assets. Therefore, the impact on the rm's stock price is neg-
ative. We assume that the overall discounted negative impact of disclosure
leads to a decrease in stock price by an amount SN := (   1)I  0, for
some parameter  such that   1 by assumption.7 On the other hand, if,
after disclosure by the manager, an investor's expected utility from investing
in the rm is better than his expected utility from investing in other assets,
he responds favourably by allocating more of his available capital to the rm.
This has a positive impact on the rm's stock price by an amount we denote
by SP . In this case, we assume that SP := (1 + )
 
UP   I  0, for some
parameter  such that    1.8 If  =  = 0, stock price maximisation and
prot maximization lead to the same policies (see also Section 5).
Since the manager is uncertain about the market response prior to dis-
closure, he knows that a negative impact on the stock price can ensue when
he discloses either a positive return or a negative return. It is clear that an
investor will respond unfavourably to a negative return, but he will also re-
spond unfavourably to the disclosure of a positive return if, in spite of this, his
expected utility from investing in other assets still exceeds his expected util-
ity from investing in the rm. Therefore, if the manager discloses a positive
return but the market responds unfavourably, the disclosure eect in this case
is given by I   UP . This occurs because when the market responds, it will
initially incorporate the positive return into the stock price, and then there
will be an additional disclosure eect. We assume that if the overall impact on
the stock price is SN , then the disclosure eect is SN   (UP   I) = I   UP .
We denote the probability (at time t  0) of an unfavourable response to the
disclosure of a positive return as P (UP jUF )P (UF jn; g), where P (UF jn; g)
is the conditional probability of an unfavourable response (an event we de-
note by UF). Thus, P (UF jn; g) = 1   P (F jn; g), where P (F jn; g), abbre-
viated by pt, is given by equation (2). Alternatively, the disclosure of a
negative return is accompanied by an unfavourable response with probabil-
ity P (UN jUF )(1  pt) =
 
1  P (UP jUF ) (1  pt). In this case, the disclosure
7It should be noted that these changes in capital allocation take place after the invest-
ment decision has been taken and they have, therefore, no inuence on the availability of
funds to pay the sunk costs of investment, I. These funds are assumed to be available.
8There is a large body of empirical and anecdotal evidence of stock price over- and
under-reactions to various streams of good and bad news (see, for example, Graham et al.
[10], Sletten [28], Arya and Mittendorf [1], and Barberis et al. [2]).
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eect is I.
A favourable response will accompany the disclosure of a positive return
with probability P (UP jF )pt. The disclosure eect is captured by (UP   I).
However, it is dicult to imagine any circumstance where a positive response
would accompany the disclosure of a negative return. Therefore, we assume
without loss of generality that P (UN jF )pt = 0. However, since pt > 0, this
implies that P (UP jF ) = 1.
Given this information, the manager's objective function is given by
max
0
Ep0

e rEp (U js )

=max
0
Ep0
h
e r

P (UP jF )p (UP   I + (UP   I))
+
 
1  P (UP jF ) p ( I + UP + (UP   I))
+ P (UP jUF )(1  p )(UP   I + I   UP )
+
 
1  P (UP jUF ) (1  p )( I + I)i
=max
0
Ep0
h
e r

p (1 + )(U
P   I) + (1  p )(   1)I
i
;
(4)
subject to (2), where   0 is a stopping time and r is the discount rate.
A few additional observations can be made about SP and SN . Firstly,
we specify these variables in terms of the payos and cost of the investment
strategy so that the model(s) which we derive in subsequent sections are easily
compared with the benchmark case of Thijssen et al. [30] which describes
the equilibrium investment behaviour of a manager with a prot maximising
objective. This enables us to ascertain clearly from our model the impact of
disclosure per se on the manager's investment timing strategy. The reasoning
for our choice of specications for SP and SN is as follows: Once disclosure has
been made, the market revises the price of the rm to incorporate the return
of the investment venture. We assume that this impacts on the stock price
by an amount equal to the revenue obtained from investment less the sunk
investment cost; i.e., by UP   I or  I. While it may appear unrealistic to
assume that stock price will change by exactly the amount of revenue gained
or lost as a result of the investment, it will, realistically, change by some
function of this amount. For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality,
we assume that the function is linear and that the proportionality constant is
one. Added to this eect, there is then an additional impact from exercising
the disclosure option owing to the market's interpretation of the information
disclosed. Secondly, it is not necessarily the case that SP = jSN j because,
as documented in the behavioural nance literature, investor sentiment in the
form of over- and under-reaction can lead to a dierential response to good
and bad news (see, for example, Fama [7], Barberis et al. [2], and Maheu and
McCurdy [18]). Furthermore, the specications of SP and SN are not as ad
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hoc or restrictive as they may initially appear. What is important is that an
investor allocates less capital to other assets the higher is his expected utility
from investing in the rm, conditional on the manager's disclosure. Therefore,
the assumption that UP , I,  and  are constant is not crucial, but is made to
keep the mathematics tractable. The problem with time-varying coecients
is that time becomes part of the state space. In that case no analytical results
can be obtained and one has to resort to numerical methods.
3 Observable Investment Decisions
In this section we consider the case whereby the investment decision made by
the manager is fully observed by the market, but the return that is acquired
from undertaking such an investment is not. (In the following section we relax
the assumption of fully observable investment decisions.) Investors in this sense
are considered to be \informed" because they can identify the rm as being one
that has invested. They know that rm possesses private information about
the investment return and, hence, the manager does not have to disclose for
the market to respond to the investment decision. The standard unraveling
argument leading to full disclosure applies and, thus, it will never be an optimal
strategy to invest and not disclose. This is because once the investors know
that the manager has invested, but he fails to disclose the return, they are
almost certain to infer that the manager has invested in a venture which has
not turned out to be protable and react through selling o their shares in the
rm and allocating their capital elsewhere. Therefore, in essence, the manager
holds one option only: to invest and disclose simultaneously, or not to invest
and, thus, not disclose at all. His problem is to determine the optimal time at
which to exercise this option; i.e., to solve for the optimal stopping problem
(4).
Solving for the problem requires obtaining a critical level above which the
manager will invest and disclose, and below which the option will not be ex-
ercised. This threshold takes the form of a conditional belief in a favourable
response to the investment return and is denoted by pid = p(s

id), where s

id is
the level of st such that the manager is indierent between investing or not.
For st  sid, or equivalently, pt  pid, the manager will invest and disclose
the return, otherwise he will wait until enough positive signals have arrived to
increase the level of st to reach the critical level.
The full solution approach to this problem is outlined in Thijssen et al.
[30], but we provide a avour for the method here. There are three regions to
be considered: In the stopping region, where st  sid, the option is exercised
immediately and the manager's payo from option exercise is given by U0(st) =
pt(1+)(U
P I)+(1 pt)( 1)I (cf. equation (4)). There are two continuation
regions in which the value of the investment-disclosure option to the manager
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is denoted by U j(st), for j = 1; 2. U
j(st) satises the Bellman equation
rU j(st) =
1
dt
E(dU j(st)): (5)
The rst region, j = 1, is such that even after a new positive signal arrives,
it is still not optimal to exercise the option; i.e., st + 1 < s

id. The associated
expression for dU1(st) deserves some explanation. Recall that with probability
dt, a new signal arrives. The signal can be positive, in which case dst = +1,
or negative, in which case dst =  1. The manager's valuation of the option
is then updated (via the updating of the posterior belief function) to either
U1(st + 1) or U
1(st   1). If no new signal arrives in the interval dt, then the
manager's valuation of the option does not change. However, even if a signal is
received and it is indicative of a favourable (unfavourable) response, the signal
is imperfect and may be incorrect; i.e., the signal may be positive (negative),
yet the subsequent response turns out to be unfavourable (favourable). The
signal is correct with probability . Hence
dU1(st) = dt
h

 
ptU
1(st + 1) + (1  pt)U1(st   1)

+ (1  )  ptU1(st   1) + (1  pt)U1(st + 1) i
+ (1  dt)U1(st):
(6)
The second continuation region for j = 2 is such that when there are st signals,
it is not optimal to exercise the option, but if one more positive signal arrives,
it will be optimal to invest; i.e., st < s

id  st + 1. The manager's valuation of
the option in this region is U2(st). In this case, if a positive signal arrives in
the interval dt, st will jump up to the stopping region whereby the option will
be exercised and the utility payo to the manager will be U0(st+1). However,
if a negative signal arrives, st will jump down to the j = 1 region and the
option will not be exercised. The valuation of the option to the manager is
then U1(st   1). This implies that dU2(st) is given by
dU2(st) = dt
h

 
ptU
0(st + 1) + (1  pt)U1(st   1)

+ (1  )  ptU1(st   1) + (1  pt)U0(st + 1) i
+ (1  dt)U2(st):
(7)
The boundary condition limst! 1 U
j(st) = 0, as well as the value match-
ing condition U2(sid) = U
0(sid) and the continuity condition
9 U1(sid   1) =
9Despite the fact that the number of signals, s, is an integer variable, the value-matching
and continuity conditions hold because the critical level, sid can be take real value. Since
the realisations of s are discrete, the option is exercised as soon as s  dside, where dside :=
minfy 2 Njy  sidg for s 2 R.
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U2(sid  1) together yield the threshold in terms of conditional belief; i.e., pid.
This is given by
pid = p(s

id) =

1 +
1 + 
1  

UP
I
  1

	
 1
; (8)
where
	 =
(r + (1  )) [1(r + )  (1  )]  21(1  )
(r + ) [1(r + )  (1  )]  21(1  ) ; (9)
and 1 >  is the larger root of the quadratic equation
Q() = 2  

r

+ 1

 + (1  ) = 0: (10)
We prove in Appendix A that pid is a well dened probability.
This implies that for all pt  pid, the manager will exercise his option
because he is suciently convinced, from the signals that he has obtained,
that investing and disclosing the return will result in a favourable market
response. This would give rise to an increase in the rm's stock price and,
hence, an increase in his own remuneration. However, for pt < p

id he is more
sceptical. Either the signals indicate that the venture will be unprotable
and that investing and disclosing the return will almost surely result in an
unfavourable market reaction. Alternatively, the signals may indicate that
investing in the venture will be protable, yet they do not suciently convince
the manager that having adopted the investment good will be a sucient
incentive to encourage the market to allocate more of its capital to the rm.
Thus, the manager will refrain from investing when pt < pid since he deems the
risk that there will be an unfavourable reaction and, consequently, a negative
impact on the rm's stock price, as being too high.
4 Unobservable Investment Decisions
When investors do not observe if and when an investment option is exercised,
the manager's optimal time to invest and his optimal time to disclose will dif-
fer. In particular, the manager will invest at some time   0, but refrain from
disclosing the return until at some later date, say  +h, when he has obtained
even more (net) positive signals regarding the expected market response. This
implies that the disclosure option, which he only acquires after having under-
taken the investment, can be exercised almost immediately, some time in the
future, or may never be exercised at all.
This behaviour is made possible owing to the fact that the manager cannot
communicate his lack of investment. Therefore, when the investment decision
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is unobservable, the rm is indistinguishable from a rm that has not invested
at all. Hence, the investors do not know whether the manager possesses any
private information and we assume that investors do not react to non-disclosure
when they cannot distinguish between a rm that has invested and a rm
that has not. Otherwise, it would not be possible to ascertain the impact of
disclosure per se on the manager's investment timing strategy.10 This implies
that, unlike in the observable investment case, the unraveling argument leading
to full disclosure does not apply. It is reasonable for us to assume, therefore,
that if the manager invests in a venture that yields a negative return, he will
hide this from the market and never disclose it. Thus, in the unobservable
investment case, it is always true that P (UF jUN) = 0.11
Intuitively, this means that at the time of investment,  , the manager
deems it more likely that disclosure at time  will result in an unfavourable
market response. However, if the market has been suciently convinced by
some future time, say  + h, that it has a use for the good, the likelihood
of a positive stock price impact through a favourable market response is high
enough to make disclosure optimal. Recall the strategy of Apple with the iPad
since this is a relevant example of such a scenario. Thus, he may take the risk
of investing at time  , but protect the eect of a negative response on the
stock price and, hence, on his compensation by choosing not to disclose. On
the other hand, he will not wait until time  + h to invest because, unless the
investment return is very low, the value of exercising the investment option
always exceeds the value of holding it. This is owing to the fact that when
the investment decision is unobservable, P (UF jUN) = 0. Hence, he knows
that if the project yields a negative return he can withhold it, and any penalty
from investing in an unprotable project (via his compensation) may never be
incurred.
Once the investment has been undertaken, the manager continues to ob-
serve signals pertaining to the expected market response that will ensue if
he subsequently exercises his disclosure option. As usual, the sunk costs of
disclosure are zero.
The optimal disclosure threshold in this case is obtained via the same
10If they could react to non-disclosure, the problem becomes one which must solve for
the full equilibrium disclosure strategy and the impact of disclosure on investment timing
could not be isolated within this larger problem.
11Of course, one could argue that any poor investment decision cannot be hidden from
the market indenitely and, therefore, it is not plausible to assert that the market will never
realise the negative return. However, if the manager has a very short-term focus because of
his own career plans, then by the time the market becomes aware of the poor investment
decision, the market reaction may no longer be a relevant concern of his. Alternatively, the
manager may act strategically to make the poor investment appear irrelevant by investing
in some other venture whose eect far outweighs the poor investment decision to the point
that the market fails to react to it at all. But, in our model, non-reaction is equivalent to
non-disclosure.
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method outlined in Section 3. This is because once the manager invests,
the decision over when to optimally disclose is independent of the invest-
ment decision, and becomes a stand-alone disclosure option. The fact that
P (UF jUN) = 0 has no technical impact on the manager's objective function
(4) and, therefore, the disclosure threshold when the investment decision is
not observed by the market will be exactly equal to the investment-disclosure
threshold when the investment decision is fully observable. For clarity, we
denote the \unobservable" disclosure (conditional belief) threshold by pd, but
technically, pd = p

id, i.e.
pd = p(s

d) =

1 +
1 + 
1  

UP
I
  1

	
 1
: (11)
Proposition 1. When the manager's investment decision is not observable,
his optimal investment policy is to invest at, or above, the belief threshold pi ,
where
pi = p(s

i ) =
h ("+ 1)  UP   I
"(I   UP )  1(1  ) (I   UP )	 + 1
i 1
; (12)
such that
" = 1(r + )  (1  ); (13)
and 1 and 	 are as previously dened. Moreover, p

i is a well-dened proba-
bility for low values of UP .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 1 depicts the unobservable investment scenario graphically. We plot
the investment and disclosure thresholds of the manager as a function of the
project return for a given value of the option to disclose. In particular we
see that the investment threshold always lies below the disclosure threshold
implying that the manager will invest and withhold disclosure for some period
until he is suciently convinced of getting a favourable market response. It is
also clear from this graph that pi > 0 for only very low levels of the investment
return. For higher values of return, pi will not be a well-dened probability
(i.e., pi !  1 as UP=I ! 1) and we interpret this as evidence that for
a suciently high investment return, the manager will always exercise his
investment option immediately because he knows that if the return ends up
being negative, he will not have to disclose it, but if the return is positive, it
is high enough to always make investment optimal.
5 A Benchmark Case
Thijssen et al. [30] solve the optimal investment policy when the manager's
remuneration is not linked to the rm's stock price. Therefore, the disclosure
15
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Figure 1: Managerial thresholds as a function of project return.
option holds no value for him and his investment policy is formed with a prot
maximising objective. Translated to our model this implies that a manager
with a prot maximising objective does not care about any possible over-
or under-reaction to the disclosure on the rm's stock-price. He only cares
about achieving a positive return which, when disclosed to the market, will be
incorporated into the rm's share price. Hence, for a manager with a prot
maximising objective,  = 0 = . For such a manager, the objective function
(4) becomes
max
0
Ep0

e rEp (U jn; g) =max
0
Ep0
h
e r

P (UP jF )p (UP   I)
+
 
1  P (UP jF ) p ( I + UP )
+ P (UP jUF )(1  p )( I)
+ (1  P (UP jUF ))(1  p )( I)
i
=max
0
Ep0

e r
 
pU
P   I :
(14)
Solving for this optimisation problem (via the method presented in Section 3)
gives the conditional belief threshold (see also Thijssen et al. [30])
~pi = p(~s

i ) =

1 +

UP
I
  1

	
 1
; (15)
where 	 is given by equation (9). This will be the benchmark against which
we compare our results.
Furthermore, the classical net present value (NPV) threshold, denoted by
pNPV , is given by
pNPV = I=U
P ; (16)
which is the solution to the equation pU
P   I = 0.
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6 Analysis of the Optimal Investment Policy
The impact disclosure has on the investment timing decision of the manager
is stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If jj  jj, then pi < pid  ~pi . Furthermore, if this condition
is satised with strict inequality, and if  is suciently small, then it also holds
that pi < p

id  pNPV .
Proof. See Appendix C.
It is clear from Proposition 2 that the larger is the positive impact on the
stock price resulting from a favourable market reaction to disclosure, , rela-
tive to the size of the negative impact from an unfavourable reaction, , the
more likely is the manager to invest sub-optimally, irrespective of whether the
investment decision is observable to the market or not. We refer to a sub-
optimal investment as one such that the investment policy of the manager
deviates from the benchmark, prot-maximising, investment policy. In par-
ticular, a manager behaves sub-optimally when he adheres to any investment
threshold which diers from ~pi .
Consider the following table of parameters, the values of which are taken
from Thijssen et al. [30]:
Table 1: Parameter values
 = 4 r = 0:1
p0 = 0:5  = 0:8
UP = 22:5 I = 12
Figure 2 shows the dierence between the investment thresholds, sid and
si , and the prot-maximising benchmark threshold, ~s

i , as a function of (1 +
)=(1   ) for the parameter values given in Table 6, and for  =  2 and
for all  2 [ 0:5; 3]. Note that in the gure the threshold is given in terms
of (net) number of signals, s, rather than in terms of p, but this is only for
ease of exposition. For the given values, ~si = 3 and this does not change with
 or . Hence, we let this represent the zero line in Figure 2. This gure
simply depicts the result that is stated in the rst part of Proposition 2 and
corresponds with our above discussion. We see that as jj increases relative to
jj, the more likely is the manager to invest too soon relative to the benchmark
case (i.e., both sid and s

i decrease relative to ~s

i ).
Recall that the manager's compensation is assumed to be dependent on
the level of the rm's stock price. The eect on the stock price will be a
result of the market reaction to the manager's disclosure of the return acquired
through investing in some risky venture. Furthermore, the disclosure option
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erences in signal thresholds.
is only acquired after the investment option has been exercised. Therefore,
this result implies that if the positive stock price impact from disclosure is
suciently high relative to the negative stock price impact, the manager will
over-invest sub-optimally so that he can acquire (and exercise) the disclosure
option and realise the benet to himself through his remuneration package.
We refer to over-investment as investment that takes place at a level of pt
such that pt < ~p

i . This implies that a manager who is more concerned with
the stock price impact of his investment decision than with the investment's
protability per se, will invest after fewer positive signals have been obtained
than the number required for an identical manager with a prot-maximising
objective. Using these parameter values given in Table 1, but letting  = 6 and
 =  2, the positive stock price impact is SP = 73:5 and the negative impact is
SN =  36. This yields a pid  90 percent and a pi = 15 percent. Additionally,
the benchmark threshold is found to be ~pi = 95 percent. This highlights our
point clearly: When SP is high relative to jSN j, both in the observable and
unobservable scenarios, the manager will invest at a lower threshold than in
the benchmark case. This is especially true in the unobservable scenario where
he only needs to be 15 percent convinced of a favourable market response.
Of course, sub-optimal investment will not only arise when the manager
over-invests, but it will also arise when the manager waits too long before in-
vesting relative to the benchmark case; i.e., he invests at some pt > ~p

i . We refer
to this sub-optimal behaviour as under-investment. The counter-argument to
Proposition 2 implies that the more muted will be the positive stock price
impact from disclosure relative to the negative impact, the greater the number
of positive signals required by the manager before he invests, relative to an
identical manager with a prot-maximising objective. This is intuitive in the
case where the investment decision is observable since he cannot invest and
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withhold information. However, when the investment decision is unobservable,
he will almost never under-invest (unless in the relatively rare situations where
jj >> ).12 This is also intuitive and is driven by the fact that P (UN jSN) = 0
in this case. Using these parameter values but letting  = 6 and  =  10,
SP = 73:5 and SN =  132. This yields a pid  97 percent and pi = 86
percent. The benchmark threshold, ~pi , is unaected and remains 95 percent.
This indicates that when jSN j is high relative to SP , the manager will under-
invest relative to the benchmark case when the investment decision is fully
observable, but will still over-invest in the unobservable case. If, however,
 = 6 but  =  35 so that the negative impact is even more pronounced; i.e.,
SN =  432, then pi  96 percent and the manager will then also under-invest
relative to ~pi in the unobservable scenario.
We also nd that the quality of the information signals, , also plays a part
in determining the manager's optimal investment policy. If the signals are not
very informative about what the market response to the investment will be,
the manager will have little incentive to study them in great depth. Thus,
when the quality of the signals is low, but the positive impact of disclosure
on the stock price is high relative to the negative impact, the manager will
expend little time and eort analysing the signals and just invest (irrespective
of whether the investment decision is observable or not). This is because, in
this situation, if there is a negative impact from investing on the stock price,
it will be relatively contained, whereas if there is a positive impact, it will
be relatively large. Thus, the manager has a lot to gain by investing and
disclosing, and little to lose. In fact, so much so that if the signal quality is
low enough and the positive impact from investing on the rm's stock price
is suciently high relative to the negative impact, the manager will even opt
to take the risk of investing in a negative NPV venture and negate to give
any signicant consideration to the signals at all. For example, if  = 10,
 =  2, then SP = 115:5 and SN =  36. Let  = 0:55 (and all other values
remain as in Table 1). Then in the benchmark case, ~pi = 71 percent with
corresponding net present value as NPV~pi = ~p

iU
P   I = 4:03 > 0. In the
observable scenario, pid = 40 percent with NPVpid = p

idU
P   I =  2:93 < 0
and, in the unobservable scenario, pi = 32 percent with NPVpi =  4:7 < 0.
Conversely, if the signals are more informative about investor response, the
manager will be more inclined to spend the time studying the signals in greater
detail. Therefore, the value of waiting to invest will be greater and hence, he
will invest only after more positive signals have been obtained; i.e., when the
NPV is higher. For example, keeping the above parameter values, but letting
 = 0:75, then pid = 82 percent with NPVpid = 6:46 > 0 and p

i = 36 percent
with NPV~pi =  3:86 < 0.13 However, in the benchmark case, ~pi = 94 percent
12The proof that, unless jj >> , pi < ~pi is trivial and is, therefore, omitted.
13Recall that in the unobservable case, the manager will almost always over-invest or, in
this case, invest in a negative NPV project, unless jSN j is very high relative to SP .
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with NPV~pi = 9:23.
These results are depicted in Figure 3 for the observable investment case. A
corresponding gure for the unobservable investment threshold is not included
as the result is qualitatively the same, but more pronounced. The parameter
values are as given above with  2 [0:55; 0:95]. Note that the dotted zero line
depicts the \classical" NPV case which stipulates that investment will occur
as soon as the expected benets from investing equal the expected costs.
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Figure 3: NPV at the time of investment as a function of .
The comparative statics for the set of parameters fUP ; I; g on the thresh-
old pid are qualitatively the same as in Thijssen et al. [30]. They prove that p

id
is increasing in I and , and decreasing in UP . We also nd that pid decreases
in r and increases in . This result appears at odds with theirs. However,
there is a minor technical error in their proof with respect to the comparative
statics for r and . In particular, their results suggest that the threshold be-
lief in a good project increases with r, which is incorrect. Furthermore, they
say that it is not possible to obtain a knife-edged result on the comparative
statics with respect to . They conclude from simulations that in most cases,
the threshold belief increases with , which is correct. However, it is not true
that a knife-edged result on comparative statics with respect to  is not pos-
sible to obtain. Therefore, for completeness, we prove in Appendix D that pid
decreases in r and increases in .
7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The results that emerge from our theoretical model show that when the man-
ager of a rm is compensated via a remuneration package that makes voluntary
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disclosure valuable to him, his investment strategy can be impacted in a sig-
nicant way.
In particular, what our results imply is that the investment behaviour of
a manager can mitigate investment eciency14 when the rm's compensation
policy does not encourage him to adopt a prot-maximising objective towards
investment. We nd that the manager may either over- or under-invest sub-
optimally when the investment option is inuenced by a valuable option to
voluntarily disclose the return acquired from the investment to the market.
The stock price linked remuneration package is what gives the disclosure option
value in our model. This is because the market reaction to the manager's
disclosure impacts on the stock price which, in turn, impacts on the manager's
compensation. Therefore, in essence, his compensation is based on the payo
from the disclosure option and thus, he makes his investment timing decision
so as to maximise the impact of the associated disclosure on the rm's stock
price while eschewing a more forward-looking prot-maximising objective.
This tendency on the part of the manager to act in his own self inter-
est and invest sub-optimally corresponds fundamentally with the denition of
myopic managerial behaviour in Cheng et al. [4]. According to Cheng et al.
[4], \myopia refers to sub-optimal under-investment in long-term projects for
the purpose of meeting short-term goals (for example, Porter [24])". In our
paper, under-investment corresponds with waiting too long before investing
when the positive impact from disclosure is small relative to the negative im-
pact. However, we also nd that managers will over-invest so that they can
be more forthcoming with disclosure in order to meet that same short-term
goal (i.e., boost their compensation). This arises when the positive impact
from disclosure is large relative to the negative impact. Indeed, one of our
main results is that if the investment strategy of the manager is not observed
by the market, he will almost always over-invest relative to a manager with a
prot-maximising objective.
Our ndings support empirical evidence that myopic behaviour can ensue
when rms' incentivisation mechanisms encourage the adoption of a short-term
perspective, such as short-term need to raise capital (which has a positive ef-
fect on the stock price) (Bhojraj and Libby [3]) and incentive compensation
concerns (Matsunaga and Park [19]). Indeed, this tendency for managers to be-
have myopically is assisted by the fact that, in our model, market participants
over-react (both positively and negatively) to rm announcements through ex-
cessive buying and selling of rm shares. An eect of this is demonstrated by
14Typically, in the corporate nance literature, an inecient investment policy is one
which deviates from the classical zero NPV policy of corporate investment. However, in
real options analysis, the zero NPV threshold is shown to be incorrect as it negates to
incorporate uncertainty and the value of waiting to invest (Dixit and Pindyck [6]; McDonald
and Siegel [20]). Therefore, since we adopt the real options analysis approach in our paper,
the ineciency arises when the investment threshold deviates from the real options prot-
maximising investment threshold, ~pi ,
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Bhojraj and Libby [3] who examine the impact of managerial myopia on capi-
tal markets. They show that rms who engage in real actions so as to meet or
beat reported earnings targets are able to boost stock price in the short-term
but can experience adverse price reversals a few years later.
This demonstrates that other mechanisms ought to be applied in such in-
stances to encourage managers to adopt more long-term prot-maximising
strategies for their investment timing decisions. One such approach could be
to re-design the manager's compensation contract so that he has no incen-
tive to withhold any of his private information from the market. In that way
the disclosure problem would become moot and the manager would have no
reason not to adopt a prot-maximising objective. In fact, according to the
revelation principle, \any contract can be re-written in a way that induces full
revelation of all private information held by the parties to it without aecting
the payments they receive" (Myerson [22]). However, such a contract could
not be applied to the set-up of our model because once any information is
disclosed, the market responds to the disclosure by optimally reallocating its
capital between the rm and other assets and, thus, altering the rm's stock
price. The only way it could be applied would be if each investor had an en-
forceable contract with the manager specifying that they would disregard the
manager's disclosure in determining their optimal capital allocation strategy.
Such contracts are not enforceable.
Another approach that could be applied to our model, however, would
be to assume that the shareholder can impose a corporate control challenge
on the manager with some positive probability. \Corporate control is the
right to determine the management of corporate resources; to hire, re and set
compensation" (see Henderson [15], Jensen and Ruback [17], Fama and Jensen
[8]). This approach would be compatible with Henderson [15] who makes the
assumption that a corporate control challenge results in dismissal. In her
model, the manager faces dismissal if the value-maximising threshold of the
shareholder is too far misaligned with the wealth-maximising threshold of the
manager. She shows, rstly, that if there is not a well-functioning market for
corporate control, the manager will make investment timing decisions which
dier markedly from rm value-maximising ones. This is consistent with our
ndings despite the driving force of our model (the eect of the voluntary
disclosure option) being dierent to hers (incomplete markets). She further
shows that when a manager who is faced with idiosyncratic risks is also subject
to a corporate control challenge, the risk of a control challenge always leads the
manager to invest at a threshold closer to the shareholders' value-maximising
threshold.
We could apply a similar line of reasoning to our model to ascertain whether
the risk of corporate control would be eective in helping to eliminate the op-
portunistic behaviour of managers for their own personal welfare. This would
require him to be more transparent with his private information, particularly
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in the case where the investment strategy is not observed by the market, so
that investors can always ensure that he acts in their best interest by adopt-
ing prot-maximising investment strategies. Therefore, we could adapt our
model to incorporate the feature of a control challenge resulting in dismissal
if the manager is found to be exercising a policy of investment that is not
suciently transparent for the market. This would allow us to determine the
extent to which such a control mechanism would be eective in discouraging
the manager from acting in this sub-optimal manner and, in particular, what
features of the model are most crucial for achieving this. Such an analysis will
be carried out in future research.
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Appendix
A Proof that ~pid is a well-dened probability
pid given by equation (8), is a well-dened probability if, and only if, 0 < p

id 
1.
pid > 0 if, and only if, 	  0, where 	 is given by equation (9). This is
because (1 + )(UP   I)  0 and (   1)I  0, by assumption. If r = 0, from
equation (10), 1 = , and 	 = 0; i.e., the numerator of (9) is zero. Hence
pid = 1 > 0.
Finding the total derivative of the numerator of 	, denoted n(	), with
respect to r yields:
@n(	)
@r
=
@n(	)
@r
+
@n(	)
@1
@1
@r
=

1(r + )  (1  )

+ 1

r + (1  )

+
@1
@r

(r + ) (r + (1  ))  2(1  )

This expression is positive since r > 0, 1 > , and
@1
@r
> 0.
Therefore n(	)  0.
On the other hand, when r = 0, the denominator of 	, denoted d(	), is
22(2   1) > 0, since  > 1
2
by assumption. Furthermore
@d(	)
@r
=
@d(	)
@r
+
@d(	)
@1
@1
@r
=

1(r + )  (1  )

+ 1

r + 

+
@1
@r

(r + ) (r + )  2(1  )

> 0:
Therefore d(	) > 0.
This proves that 	  0 and pid > 0.
pid  1 if, and only if, 	  0. Indeed, 	  0, since r  0, and thus pid  1.
Hence, pid, given by equation (8), is a well-dened probability.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that at time t  0 the net number of signals, st, is such that even
after a new positive signal arriving, it is still not optimal to invest; i.e., st+1 <
26
si . It then follows from Thijssen et al. [30] that the value of the investment
opportunity, denoted by V1(st), equals
V1(st) =
A1
st
1
st + (1  )st ;
where A1 is a constant and 1 >  is the larger (real) root of the quadratic
equation (10).
Alternatively, if the value of st is such that it is not optimal to exercise
the investment option immediately, but if the manager obtains one more (net)
positive signal it will be optimal to invest (i.e., if si   1  st < si ), then
Thijssen et al. [30] show that the value of the investment opportunity, denoted
by V2(st), equals
V2(st) =

r + 
hst+1 + (1  )st+1
st + (1  )st 
(st + 1)
+ (1  ) A1
st 1
1
st + (1  )st
i
:
(B.1)
Here 
(st) denotes the total value of the undertaking investment for the man-
ager at time t when there are s net positive signals. Note that the total value
refers to both the impact from investment and the subsequent acquiring of the
disclosure option on the rm's stock price:

(st) =P (U
P jSP )p(st)(UP   I) + P (UP jSN)(1  p(st))(UP   I)
+ \Value of Disclosure Option" at st
=UP   I + \Value of Disclosure Option" at st;
(B.2)
since P (UP jSP ) = 1 always and P (UN jSN) = 1   P (UP jSN) = 0 in the
unobservable case.
As soon as the manager invests, he immediately acquires an option to
disclose his investment decision to the market. We denote by sd the threshold
number of positive over negative signals above which he will opt to disclose
and not otherwise. The Bellman equation for an active rm (i.e., one that has
invested) in the region where st < s

d   1 is
C(st) = e
 rdtE[dC(st)] (B.3)
and E is the expectation operator.
The solution to equation (B.3) is given by
C(st) =
B1
st
1
s + (1  )st
where B1 is constant and 1 >  is the larger root of the associated quadratic
equation, and this is also given by equation (10).
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Alternatively, if the net number of signals, st, is such that it is not optimal
to disclose at time t, but if the manager obtains one more (net) positive signal
about the likely market response, then it will be optimal to disclose (i.e., if
sd   1  st < sd), then the value function in this region becomes:
CU(st) =

r + 
hst+1 + (1  )st+1
st + (1  )st U^(st + 1) + (1  )
B1
st 1
1
st + (1  )st
i
;
where U^(st) denotes the additional conditional expected value to the manager
from exercising the disclosure option at st after the (positive) payo acquired
from the investment has been incorporated into the stock price. This value is
given by
U^(st) =P (U
P jSP )p(st)
 
SP   (UP   I)
+ P (UP jSN)(1  p(st))
 
SN   (UP   I)
=p(st)
 
UP   I+ (1  p(st))(I   UP ): (B.4)
In order to solve for the optimal time to invest, given that through invest-
ing the manager acquires an option to disclose his investment decision to the
market, we must solve for the following two optimality conditions:
V1(s

i   1) = V2(si   1) (B.5)
and
V2(s

i ) = 
(s

i ): (B.6)
Owing to the presence of the disclosure option, 
(si ) takes dierent forms
depending on the value of si in relation to the value of the disclosure threshold
sd. If s

i 1  st < sd 2, then after one more positive signal, it will be optimal
to invest, but not disclose. Even after two more positive signals, it will still
not be optimal to disclose. Therefore

(st) =U
P   I + C(st)
=UP   I + B1
st
1
s + (1  )st :
(B.7)
On the other hand, if si   1  st < sd   1 and if, simultaneously, st  sd   2,
then after one more net positive signal it will be optimal to invest, but not to
disclose. However, if there are two more net positive signals it will be optimal
to invest and to disclose. This implies that the value of the disclosure option
that the manager acquires upon investing is CU(). Thus

(st) =U
P   I + CU(st)
=UP   I + 
r + 
hst+1 + (1  )st+1
st + (1  )st U^(st + 1)
+ (1  ) B1
st 1
1
st + (1  )st
i
:
(B.8)
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Substituting for V2(s

i ) and 
(s

i ) in equation (B.6) using equations (B.1) and
(B.7) and (B.8), respectively, yields two equations which may be solved simul-
taneously (after some rather cumbersome, but trivial, algebraic manipulation)
for pi . We nd that the solution for p

i is as follows:
pi =
h ("+ 1)  UP   I
"(I   UP )  1(1  ) (I   UP )	 + 1
i 1
; (B.9)
where
" = 1(r + )  (1  ) (B.10)
and 	 is given by equation (9).
B.1 Proof that p(si ) is a well-dened probability for a
low investment return
p(si )  pi , given by equation (B.9), is a well-dened if, and only if, 0 < pi  1.
pi > 0 if 	  0, where 	 is given by equation (9) and if
"+ 1
"(I   UP )  1(1  )(I   UP ) > 0; (B.11)
where " is given by equation (B.10). This is because UP  I, by assumption.
In Appendix A we showed that 	  0, and thus, it is only necessary for us
to show that the condition given by (B.11) holds.
We rst show that " > 0: If r = 0, 1 = . Thus " = 
2 > 0. @"=@r =
(r + )@1=@r + 1 > 0, since @1=@r > 0 and 1 > . Thus, for r > 0,
" > 2 > 0. So " > 0.
Now, since, " > 0 and I   UP  0 (because UP  I by assumption and
  1 by denition of SN), the denominator of (B.11) is more likely to be
positive the lower is UP . Hence, we only need to show that if " + 1 > 0,
the condition will hold when UP is low. If r = 0, the latter equation becomes
2(1 + ) > 0 since    1 by denition.
@
@r
("+ 1) = 1 + (r + (1 + ))
@1
@r
which is denitely positive if    1=, since @1=@r > 0. But since    1
and   1, then    1=. Hence, "+ 1 > 0 and condition (B.11) holds
when UP is low.
On the other hand, pi  1 if and only if
("+ 1)
 
UP   I
"(I   UP )  1(1  )(I   UP )	  0;
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which we have just shown to be true when UP is low.
Thus, pi is a well-dened probability when the investment return is low.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The derivation of pi , given by equation (12), is obtained via the assumption
that si < s

d. Since s

i and s

d are increasing in p

i and p

d, respectively, then
pi < p

d. However, as we discuss in Section 4, p

d = p

id, where p

id is given by
equation (8). Therefore, it always holds that pi < p

id.
pid  ~pi if and only if
1  1 + 
   1

UP   I
I

	
 1


1 +
UP   I
I
	
 1
()  (1 + )     1
()   
()  jj
pid  pNPV if and only if
1  1 + 
   1

UP   I
I

	
 1
 I
UP
()  1 + 
   1	  1
()(1 + )	  1  :
This latter condition will hold if   jj and   1=2.
D Comparative Statics of pid w.r.t. r and 
@pid
@
> 0; i
@	
@
< 0;
for  = fr; g.
We re-write equation (9) as
	 =
(r + (1  ))"(r; ; )  (r; ; )
(r + )"(r; ; )  (r; ; ) ;
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where
"(r; ; ) = 1(r + )  (1  )
and
(r; ; ) = 21(1  ):
Then since 	 > 0 (see Appendix B.1), to determine the sign of the derivative
with respect to  = fr; g, we only need to compare the respective derivatives
of (r + (1  )) and (r + ).
@
@r
(r + (1  )) = 1 = @
@r
(r + ) :
Since 	 > 0 and the derivatives of both (r+(1 )) and (r+) with respect
to r are equal, then @	
@r
increases in 	, and hence, pid decreases in r.
Finally,
@
@
(r + (1  )) = 1   < @
@
(r + ) =  > 0:
Since @
@
(r + ) > @
@
(r + (1  )), the eect on the denominator of 	 dom-
inates. Therefore,
@	
@
< 0;
and thus, pid increases in .
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